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THE INCIDENCE OF XAR[ET-STABILIZING PRJCE SUPPORT SCHEMES •
Brian D. Wriaht and Jeffrey C. William,
Yale University and Brandeis University

Prominent among government interventions into aartets for aaricultural
and other primary products are various programs for supportina producer
prices.

Many of these schemes, that for dairy products in the United States

for example, have a fairly obvious price-raising rationale.

Here we

consider the implications of schemes, such as measures for supporting arain
prices, that might be defended as market-stabilizing in that their support
levels are below the mean price.

Even if market participants are risk

neutral. such scheme• can significantly affect their welfare.
One such scheme involves deficiency payments which the government pays
producers as the difference, if podtive, between a target price. and the
market price.

Another is a floor price scheme of the simplest type, in

which the government, or an association of producers. makes an open offer to
buy or. subject to availability of public stocks. to sell the commodity at a
'floor price.'

Floor price schemes are more colDJllOn in practice than

deficiency payments.

They are also more complex interventions, directly

affecting both production and private storage.
Schemes involving price floors tend to follow a familiar pattern,
Producers complain of a large quantity 'overhanging' the market and of the
low incomes that result.

The government responds by purchasing the surplus

and raising the current price, with the intention of selling later when the
aarket is stronaer.

Yet. after only a few years have aone by. producers

aaain articulate the complaint, confirmed by impartial observers. that their

incomes have fallen despite the program.

Pressure 1110unts for a higher

support level, the sequence then repeating itself.
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This apparent failure of most price floor schemes, which has important
political consequen ces, is sometimes attribute d to secular decline in the
terms of trade for primary commodit ies.

Another cause lies in the

differenc es between the initial effects and comparati ve statics effects of
the schemes. Acquisiti ons for the stockpile boost producers ' revenues in the
early years of a scheme.

But after it has been in operation for a long

time, average revenue for producers may well be lower than if no scheme
existed.

The present value of the income path can be positive even if the

long-run effect on producers • income is negative.

Whenever the present

value of the income path is positive, producers will rationall y support
floor schemes, al though they will repeatedl y argue for a higher floor, 'in
order to benefit from the boost provided by the additiona l accumulat ion of
governmen t stocks.
Thus, dynamic effects determine who benefits, and by how much, from the
program's introduct ion.

The crucial inter-per iod connectio ns, forged by

storage and responsiv e supply, determine the initial effects of

a

commodity

program and the subsequen t evolution to the new stochasti c steady state.
Unfortun ately, the dynamic effects can be deduced only from nu.me rical so
lution of a model of a commodity market.

On the other hand, comparati ve

statics effects can be assessed analytica lly, and perhaps that explains why
they have been the focus of most previous studies of market stabiliza tion
(e.J. Newbery and Stiglitz 1981 and reference s therein).

But they do not

adequatel y indicate the incidence effects that are the subject of this paper.
We

begin in Section 1 with an outline of a model with a simple price

support scheme.

Then we discuss in Section 2 the implicati ons of

a

price

support scheme in the steady state, assuming it stabilize s consupti on. Jn
Section 3 we consider the dynamic evolution of the mod~l after a policy
change, and this discussio n leads to an assessmen t of the incidence effects
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of price supports in Section 4, includinJ the contrast with coaparative
statics results.

In Sections Sand 6 we consider the implications of

responsive supply and risk aversion, and conclusions follow in Section 7.

1.

A Market Model with a Random Disturbance and Private Storage
Under a scheme either of deficiency payments or of a price floor,

government intervention in any low-price period is price-stabilizing for
producers, in the sense that it aoves current producer price toward the mean
of its post-stabilization distribution.

When making deficiency payments,

the government pays producers the difference, if positive, between
price' PT and the market price Pt paid by consumers in period t.

a

'target

So under

•

this scheme, producer price Pt is

(1)

Under a floor price scheme, the government ensures that the producer price,
which is also the market price, does not fall below the floor price~:

(2)

F

The floor price is defended by an open offer to purchase any amount at P
In a so-called 'price band' scheme, resale of stocks
triagered at a price above~-

10

acquired may be

Here we consider only the simpler case in

which the 1overDJDent stands ready to buy or sell (subject to its having a
sufficient quantity in store) any amount at PF.

Both the taraet price PT

and the floor price~ are assumed to be below the free-market mean.
From producers' perspective, less simplistic 1over11J11ent rules may be

superior,

But the prevalence of relatively simple or arbitrary rule,

implies that aovernments find it difficult to identify and implement more
complex alternatives.

Indeed Wright and Williams (1982b) ahow that

the

conventional stochastic dynamic progra111JDing strateay for investigating such
policies encounters a problem of the type identified by lydland and Prescott
(1977): the 'state variable' is a function of private storage and
production, which in turn depend upon expectations of future public storage
behavior.
Apart from the presence of public storage and deficiency payments or
pdce floors, the market model sketched in the next several paragraphs
follows that developed for undistorted private storage in Wriaht and
Williams (1982a).

For the incidence of support schemes, three

characteristics of the model are particularly important: the degree of
curvature in the demand curve, the supply elasticity, and the nature of the
random market disturbance.
Ye specify the stationary inverse consumption demand for the commodity
in each period as

(3)

pt = a + bqt

1-C

aP/aq

,

<o

where Pt is the market price in year t and qt is the quantity consumed.
Income is assumed constant for consumers throughout, so the income term is
~uppressed in (3).

This form includes the linear (a> 0, b< 0, C = 0) and

constant elasticity (a~ 0, b

> 0,

C

> 1)

specifications.

The relative

curvative of the demand curve is constant in (3), and is aeasured by C

=

Ye consider two alternate assumptions regarding the market di,turbance.
One is that production ht is subject to a disturbance proportional to

-5the amount of the planned harvest h, which must be chosen in period t-1.
The short-run (within-period) supply response is assumed to be zero.

2

The

supply function is therefore

(4)

where the disturbance vt is drawn from a distribution which is serially

uncorrelated, with mean of zero and finite variance, and P; is the
marginal incentive as of period t-1.

Assuming all atomistic producers share

this multiplicative disturbance, under rational expectations (see Wright
(1979)) Pr is
t

•

= BEt-1CPtht]

( 5)

B'nt

= Et-1

•

[Ptht]
Ii.t

where Et-l denotes the expectation operator given the information available
in period t~l.

Atomistic profit-maximizing producers individually view

price as exogenous to their production decisions, but recognize that their
own production disturbance will affect price because it is shared by others.
P~ is a function not only of the mean but also of higher moments of the
distribution of the disturbance Vt in (4) above.
The alternate assumption is that the stochastic disturbance shifts
market demand.

We attribute the shift in market demand observed by

producers in the region or country of interest to what is in fact the most
usu.al cause, namely random fluctuation in excess demand from other regions

or countries, reflecting production disturbances therein.

Since excess

demand ia assumed to be unresponsive to incentives, perhaps because of price

controls in the foreign market, these fluctuations are exoaenous to the
model.

The supply function is in this case

-6( 6)

+ w
t

where wt is i.i.d. with mean zero and finite variance.

(With such an

additive disturbance , P; equals expected price.)
N
If the disturbance is fixed ,at zero. production and cons1111ption is q,

price is~. revenue is RN, and storage equals zero.

Otherwise, the

quantities produced, consUJDed, and stored satisfy the following
market-clea ring condition:

(7)

where St-l 2_ 0 is total storage from period t-1 to period t, comprising
private storage,

s;.

and government storage,

s:.

and At is the amount

available in period t, the commodity when previously stored being
indistinguis hable from new production,
Competitive private storage, if strictly positive, equates current
consumption price Pt to the return from the next period, net of marginal
storage costs kt, assumed constant, and interest costs at rater> 0.

Thus,

for private storage the familiar complementa ry inequalitie s bold:

(8)

0

> (1

0

=

(1

These conditions implicitly determine the amount of private storage as a

function of the amount available and the floor price,
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(9)

The aovernment's behavior is determined by its commitment to buy or sell any
aaount. subject to the availability of stocks. at the floor price.

s't

(10)

F

where q

= llu[At -

Sc-_ qF OJ,
•
t

s:

Thus,

F
I (At, PF)

F
is amount consumed at the price floor, P

s:

F 1-C

a + b (q )

•

In examining the incidence of public price supports, we assume that the
market is initially in a stochastic steady state.

Upon the simultaneous

announcement and introduction of the price support scheme, asswned
permanent, the market suffers an initial perturbation, then follows a path
that converges to the new steady state, as shown in the example in Figure 1.
The initial steady state revenue is the random variable R
ss

At period 0,

when realized revenue of producers. who are assumed to own all of the large

available supply. would be
.

I.
the introduction of a floor price scheme
0

F
shifts the revenue realization to R.
0

0

0

Conditional on the information set

availa~le at period 0, the path of expected revenue years in the future

is aiven by E(R/ Q, PF) which converges to mean revenue in the new steady
0

state.,!.
IS

In the next three sections we shall consider, first, the

effect of price supports on current flows in the steady state, then the
nature of the dynamic path, and fin•lly the full incidence effects of the
schemes on individuals.

-8-

2.

Multi-Per iod Comparati ve Statics
Obviously , under a deficienc y payment scheme, financed in a lump-sum

fashion. storage is not directly affected by the tar1et price.
is induced indirectl y, via the productio n response.

Any effect

Therefore , the first

propositi on is:

Propositi on 1:

If. supply elasticit y ia zero, a deficienc y payments sche111e

with lump-sum financing affects only producer income.

In the

The effects of a floor price scheme are more interesti na.
stochasti c steady state mean consumpti on equals mean productio n.

Then .~s

long as supply elasticit y is zero the scheme does not alter mean
conslimpti on, regardles s of the existence of private storage.
is in general consumpt ion-stabil izing, then the change in

If the floor

consumpti on is a

mean-pre serving reduction in its dispersion ,_ the opposite of a

mean-pres erving spread (Rothschi ld and Stiglitz 1970). This implies the
following propositi on regarding price:

Propositi on 2:

If the consumer demand curve is stationar y, and linear or

convex in the range of possible consumpti on, and supply elasticit y is zero,
a floor price scheme cannot raise mean price in the steady state.

For the demand specifica tion (3) above, Pis convex (concave) in q as C
(0 O.

>

For the linear specifica tion (C = 0), mean price is unaffecte d by a

floor price, while for the constant elasticty specifica tion (C = (1 - 1/~D)
) 1) a reduction in the dispersio n of quantity consumed reduces aean price.

-9-

Of course revenue, not price, matters to producer,.

The effect of a

price floor on mean revenue or on mean consumer expenditure, Pq
sensitive to the demand specification.

(11)

a2 (Pq)/aq2

Proposition 3a:

i, also

From (3),

= (2 - C)(l - C) bq-c = (2 - C)aP/aq

When supply is perfectly inelastic, and the disturbance is

in production, the comparative statics effect of a floor price scheme on
mean consumer expenditures is positive (negative) as C h

less (greater)

than 2.

Thus, in the linear case for example, mean revenue always increases with the
floor price. but for the case of constant elasticity, mean expenditure
decreases (increases) if demand is price inelastic (elastic).

These

expenditures go both to producers and to private storers, but the latter, by
our assumption of competition along with constant mar1inal and average
storage costs, make zero profits on average.

Proposition 3b:

When the disturbance is in production, and supply

elasticity is zero, the comparative statics effect of a floor price scheme
on mean producer revenue is of the same sign as (2 - C - l(ASc)) where ASc
is the expected steady state chan1e in private storaae, 1(0) = 0, and
as:ta<Asc>

> o.

The fllllction I reflects storage coats and can be determined numerically. 3

But what if local producers face a random disturbance in market demand, as
in (6) above?

Then, if the local producers have fixed, nonstochastic

production, the effect on their expected revenue is

-10proportional to the effect on expected price in Proposition 2.

Proposition 4:

Producers have a comparative statics loss of expected

revenue from the stabilization of an exogenous additive disturbance to
aarket demand if C

> O.

Bow do consumers fare under consumption-st abilizing price supports?
The steady-state effects on the rerresentative consumer, under zero supply
elasticity, depend on the convexity or concavity of the indirect utility
function V(P,Y).

The following proposition is proved in Wright and Williams

(1984a, p. 171):

Proposition S:

The comparative statics effect on consumer welfare of

stabilization of consumption, under zero supply elasticity, bas the sign of
the coefficient of relative commodity risk aversion with respect to quantity
cons11J11edr at the (variable) market price, defined as:

(12)

where l is the budget share, ~y is the income elasticity of demand, and Py
is the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of relative risk aversion with respect to Y.
What are the implications of introducing positive finite supply
response?

For producers, positive supply response mitigates but does not

reverse the distributive bias of a floor price scheme, reported in
Propositions 2 through 4. Similar findings were derived for 'ideal
production stabilization' in 1riaht (1979), and for the comparative statics
effects of profit-aaximizi ng private storaae in Wright and Williams (1982a).
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However, with

a

multiplicative supply disturbance (4) the increa,e in

steady state supply at low valuu of C, due to the respon,e of pr,
■eans

that consUJDers can now Jain

than indicated in Proposition 5.

fro■

(S),

stabilization over a wider range of C

But at hiaher values of C, or with an

additive disturbance (6_). aean production and consumption are decreased.
reducing any conswner Jain from areater coDsaaption stability. 4
When supply elasticity is positive, deficiency payments increase mean
consumption and production but restrict the complementary interactions of
private storage and production described in Yriaht and Williams (1982a).
Bence they reduce the stabilizing role of storage, and destabilize
consumption and price.
expenditures?

How do floor price schemes affect aovernment

Until recently it was standard practice to assume no private

storage at all when examining the prospects for public buffer stock schemes.
(Exceptions are Helmberger and Weaver (1977), Sharples (1980), Gardner
(19?9) and Wright and Williams (1982b).)

If private storage is ignored, the

government may possibly run a storage scheme at a profit. But it seems more
reasonable to assUJDe expected- profit-maximizing 5 competitive 6 private
storage whether or not the government intervenes.

Under these conditions

the private market will compete away any expected profits if the government
has no cost advantage, while the private sector will avoid expected losses.
Thus, we have:

Proposition 6:

If expected-profit-maximizing competitive private storers

exist, the aovermient, except in the limiting case of breaking even, suffers
an expected revenue loss from any floor price scheme.

These analytical propositions have all been checked by extensive
numerical analysis.

To solve the stochastic dynamic progrUUDing problem for

-12the private storage rules under deficiency payments and price floors,
denoted by functions r°(A • PT) and fF(A , PF), and to calculate welfare
t
t
effects,

we use a aethod siailar to that described in Wright and Williams

(1984a} aodified to take account of the support aeasures.
Ye assume
■arkets.

parameters rouahly consistent with those of U.S. arain

The consuaption 4eaan4 elasticity is -0.2 at the nonstochastic

equil ibriua and the budget share is very s11al 1. justifying use of expected
consumer surplus as an approximation to ex apte compensating variation
(Wright and Williams 1984c).

The disturbance has a SJ11Ubetric

7 five point

distribution expressed in terms of mean production of -15', -7.S~. 0.OCli,

+7.S~. and +15.M with probabilities 0.0S, 0.20, 0.S0, 0.20, and 0.05
respectively.
of

pN,

Xarginal storage costs, whether public or private, are 2.S~

and the interest rate is S~.

The results of simulations (7500

periods) of this aodel wue used to approximate the steady state effects of
price supports.

They uniformly confirm the analytical propositions of this

section, 11UDJ11arized in Table 1.

3.

The Dynamic Evolution of Producer Income

The effect on revenue of a floor price scheme can diverge greatly from
the long-run steady state effect for many periods after its introduction.
This is obvious from Figure 1, which was aenerated using the nu,erical
■ethods

discussed above. Therefore, to assess the incidence of

a

scheme, it

is necessary to 10 beyond the coaparative statics results of the previous
section and consider explicitly the dynamic evolution of the effects of the
scheme.

The expected time path of producer revenue as of the introduction

of a support price equal to 90.. of the price

pN,

less the path expected

-13without the price support, is shown in Fi1ure 2 for two levels of initial
The base.case (panel 2a) is the cue ahown in Figure l.

availability.

Demand has constant price elasticity. curvature parameter C equals 6.0,

supply elasticity ia zero, and the disturbance ia located in production.
The other five cases show the relative importance of T&riations in
specification.

In each panel of Figure 2, the sequence denoted by dots represents the
case in which a large amount of the commodity, 12°'9 of qN, is initially
available.

(Presumably, a support scheme would be aore likely to be

introduced if current price were -unusually low.) Producers are assumed to
own all initial availability.
overstated.)

(If they do not, their &•ins in period O are

Subsequently, the luck of the sequence of draws of the random

disturbance determines the precise path and whether, ex post, the scheme has
raised or lowered income in any given period. Several periods into the
scheme, by chance the course of the random disturbance may have been such
that the price support scheme benefited producers every period so far.

With

another sequence, the buildup of public stocks may have been so areat over
the course of several periods that when a saall harvest occurred. one that
with the smaller stocks accumulated without a floor would have raised price
substantially, price remained low, and as a result income was much lower
than it would have otherwise been.

The discrete sequences in Figure 2

present the avera1e of 10,000 of these paths, each followed for eleven
periods from the introduction of the scheme.
All the dotted sequences in Figure 2, beginning from a larae initial
availability, show the price floor eventually becoming, on averaae, a less
effective income support as tiae aoes by.

This decay in effectiveness of

income support holds also for deficiency payments (panel 2f) when the
initial availability is lar1e, in which cue it represents converaence

-14towards the comparative statics differential discussed above. But in
contrast to the case of price floors, the decline is monotonic.
The paths of

a ■ all

squares in Fiaure 2 indicate cases in whicb tbe

initial conditions were low availability (9()11 of qN) and hi&h price.

In

these cases the announcement of the floor price scheme antedates the initial
aquiaitions of aovernment stocks.

With a price floor, the path of the

differential in revenue rises initially, because expected net acquisitions
for the government stock are positive for a number of periods after the time
of introduction.

(Because initial availability is

10

low, it is likely that

the first acquisitions will not occur until several periods have elapsed.)
The expected path eventually turns downward, to converge on the steady state
differential~ which is negative under

a

price floor if C exceeds 2-K.

In

the case of a deficiency payments scheme introduced when the market is
tight, the expected revenue path increases monotonically to the steady state
level.

4.

The Incidence of Price Supports
The steady state results for producer surplus, and the dynamic paths,

help us to understand how price supports change the path of income flows in
a co111111odity aarket.

But the change in current income in any period does not

indicate the incidence on current producers.

Upon the (unanticipated)

implementation of a permanent support scheme at tiae t 0 , the value of Jand 8
and the price of the co111J11odity will adjust i-ediately to new dynamic
equilibrium levels, assuming full Ricardian capitalization. 9

Assuming risk

neutrality, the change in land value is the expected present value at t

0

of

the change in the income flow from land, from the time of the next harvest,
t1, to infinity.

Any expected net aains or losses from the program accrue

to those OWlliaa, at t , land or the commodity.
0

Their

-15change in wealth equals the chanae in land value plus the chanae in the
value of initial stocks.
The near-term boost in demand associated with accuaulation of public
stocks may be sufficient to raise producers' wealth, asa1lllliDJ they own the
land at the time of introduction of the scheme. even if the long-run effect
on income is negative.

Quite aiaply, the initial boost occurs because the

government must buy before it can sell, and it is important because the
long-run steady state is heavily discounted.
A convenient summary of the distributive effects of various price

floors and deficiency payments on producers and consumers is presented by
surplus transformation curves. such as those in Figure 3.

Gardner (1983)

and Josling (1974) use similar curves to show the comparative static effects
on current surplus flows of price-raising schemes in the context of a
deterministic market (where stabilization cannot be an issue).
the origin represents the initial free market situation.

In Figure 3,

Consumer and

landholder benefits are measured by the expected present value of consumer
surplus and producer surplus respectively, expressed as a percentage of RN,
the product of pN and qN defined above. Here it is assumed that the scheme
is financed with a lump-sum tax on producers.

Thus, the curves indicate

whether an association of risk-neutral producers, rather than the
aovern.ment, would find it advantageous to initiate a floor price scheme or
make deficiency payments.

For the case of zero supply elasticity and constant elasticity of
de■ and.

the surplus transformation curve OA in Fiaure 3 shows the effects of

introducin& various levels of price floors in a year t 0 in which
availability A0 is 120lfa of qN, so that there will be a large carryover in
storaae.

Selected price floors are marked on OA, as fractions of~-

Unlike the surplus transformation curves for price supports in a

-16deterministic model, which raise

■ean

producer price (Gardner 1983), the

curve OA is non-concave. For floors up to 85, of PN, producers lose while
there is a net transfer to consumers present and future.
the schemes are much less favorable to cons1111ers.

For biaher floors

At the 9c,ir. level, for

example. the scheme reduces wealth of current producers and the welfare of

present and future consumers.

But if price is 9S, of PN. current producers

have a clear gain in wealth from the scheme while consumers lose.
The difference in the desirability of various floors can be explained
as follows. The current effect of an early purchase at the floor price is to
increase current producer surplus and reduce current consumer surplus.
Subsequent resale reduces. that period's producer surplus and increases
consumer surplus. and these current effects, at high values of
in magnitude the initial requisition effects.

c.

dominate

Yhen the price floor is 80%

of pN, the effect of the scheme is to increase total stocks in periods of
surplus, but this increment is typically resold fairly quickly. once the
market price rises above the floor. as illustrated in panel b of Figure 2.
The expected duration of holding is sufficiently small that the net effect
is an increase in the present value of consumer surplus, and a fall in the
value of land plus stocks held at the time of introduction of the scheme~
When the price floor is closer to the free market mean, as in panel a of
Figure 2, buffer stock additions are
rarely. in the early periods.
■arainal

incre ■ent

■ore

frequent, and releases occur more

Thus. the expected holding period of an early

is of sufficiently greater duration that the initial

welfare effects dominate, so that the scheme favors producers at the expense

of consumers.
The vertical distance to the surplus transformation curve. from the
diaaonal OC, the locus of fully efficient transfer. aeasures the total

dead-weiaht loss of a scheme.

A slope of 1reater than -1.0 indicates a

-17marginal dead-weight loss from an increase in the price support. Deficiency
payments when supply is perfectly inelastic have no dead-wei&bt loss.

The

transfer to producers equals the cost of the scheme, so with producer
financing the relevant transformation curve collapses to the oriain O.

On

the other hand, price floors can have a substantial dead-weight Joas for
high floors, approaching 40-. of bud1etary expenditures on average and

65~

. 10
a t th e margin.
The dead-weight loss from

a

price floor supported through public

storage arises precisely because 1tora1e is socially excessive.
held in store and for too long, on average.

Too 11YUch is

Much of the budgetary expense,

which might otherwise go to producers, is wasted through excessive physical
storage and interest costs.
Given the wastefulness of storage expenses in a floor price scheme,
destruction upon acquisition at the price floor, or other extra-market
disposal such as foreign aid, of some part of the supply might be a superior
policy.

In the constant elasticity demand specjfication with zero supply

elasticity it is easy to show that in a c.omparative statics analysis the
response of producer surplus (PS) and consumer surplus (CS) to marsinal
destruction of output is

(13)

d(PS)/d(CS) = -(2-C)/(1-C)

which, in the example with C=6, equals -0.8.

In Figure 3, the curve OE,

aenerated numerically, shows the tradeoff for A0 equal to 120I, of qN. Its

slope. which is very close to -0.8, is steeper than that of OA.
deadweight.loss is less than half of that of a price floor.

The

The excess

costs of storage are, of course, far less obvious than those incurred by
dumping arain in the ocean or burning it, so the more costly method 111ay be

-18-

more politically palatable.

In some circumstances a method of removal of

product more acceptable to self-interested domestic producers may be foreign
'aid', especially if the recipients are effectively segregated from

commercial markets.

Such aid may be far more efficient as a means of

domestic transfer to producers than a floor price scheme, even if any

benefit to the recipients is entirely ianored •
. Results for the other specifications offered in the literature, with
the same consumer demand curve and initial availability, are also shown in
Figure 3.

The inclusion of private storage in the aodel is dramatically

vindicated by comparing curve OA with curve OF, which holds private storage
at zero.
floors.

The curve OF would lead to two wrona inferences about price
First, without private storage, a floor price scheme with the floor

levels shown appears more (incrementally) efficient than

a

lump sum transfer

(represented by the diagonal OC) because it is a good substitute for the
absent, and socially valuable, private storage.

Second, it would appear

producers would never gain from such a scheme, with this demand
specification.

The importance of recognizing dynamics is emphasized by

curve 0G which shows the comparative statics results of a floor price scheme
with private storage. From them it would appear consumers Jain and producers
lose over the whole range of price floors whereas the true incidence
combinations cover any of three quadrants, as shown by curve OA.
erroneous inference from the comparative statics measure is that

A further
a

low price

floor could increase net social welfare, since the deadweight loss, measured
by the distance from OC, appears to be negative.

This apparent social gain

reflects the fact that the cost of the expected accumulation to the
stochastic iteady state is ianored.

The only cost of stocks considered in

the comparative statics is the current physical storage costs k.
· If, as specified in equation (6), the disturbance acts as a shifter of

-19market demand, then the surplus transformation curve is OB.

Clearly a high

floor price is very inefficient, in terms of the interests of all
participants within the market considered, and can decrease both expected
consUJDer welfare and producer wealth.
understand.

The reason for this is easy to

The market demand shifter is excess foreign demand, which is by

aaswnption unresponsive to price and has a mean of zero.

The domestic

market &ains by selling in times of positive excess demand, and buying, at a
lower price, at times .of positive excess supply.

Stabilization of price

reduces this ar.bitra1e advanta1e, and favors the country that is the source
11
of excess demand (whose welfare is not taken into account here.)
One would rightly suspect. from consideration of the comparative

statics propositions in Section 2, that the demand curve parameter C would
be crucial in Figure 3.

Figure 4 shows the surplus transformation curves

when the consumption demand curve is linear (C=O).

Here the direction of

the distributional results is generally in favor of producers.

Curve OA

shows the surplus transformation achieved by a price floor scheme introduced
when A0 is once again equal to 12()11, of qN.

Curve OB shows the.surplus transformation when there is an exogenous
disturbance in demand.

Once again the transfer at high floor levels is very

inefficient from a domestic viewpoint, since the 'foreign' participant
gains from the stabilization scheme.

On the other hand destruction, shown

by curve OE. is less efficient relative to the floor price scheme (OA).
Recent policy choices (for example the United States PIK program)
indicate that the public sector may be more concerned with budget costs than
with welfare.

Fi1ure S compares the wealth transferred to producers, 1ross

of budget costs, to the present value of the budgetary expenditures under a
selection of programs.

Curve AA, which represents the standard case (ri° =

-0.2. C=6) for initial availability of 120IJ, of qN shows that deficiency

-20payments dominate in transfer per bud1et dollar.

Curve RB shows that if

there is an exo1enous foreign disturbance in market demand, a price floor
scheme is inefficient in converting budget resources into

producer wealth.

Thia is not true in the same circumstances if demand is linear (C
shown by curve JJ.

~

0), as

Linear demand implies hi1her bud1et efficiency if the

disturbance is in supply, as shown by curve ll, and hiaher levels of
transfer are achieved more efficiently by the floor price scheme than by
deficiency payments.

All of ·these results are in line with those of

Figures 3 and 4. But the case of destruction or extra-aarket disposal is
different.

For the standard case, curve OE shows that producers gain far

■ore per unit espendi ture under this policy than undet· price floors or

deficiency payments, and this is also

true in the linear case (curve OF).

For equivalent producer gain, the average amount purchased for destruction
is so auch less than the average amount stored that the expected present

value of the net costs of extra storage exceeds the cost of purchase for
destruction.

5.

The Implications of Responsive Supply for Incidence
Thus far in our discussion of incidence we have assumed that planned

production his fixed and producers do not respond to changes in their
incentive Pr.

In the comparative statics analysis reported in Table 1, the

effect of such responsiveness is very predictable--it reduces the bias in
the 'redistribution' caused by the price floor, but it does not alter the
1i1n of the bias.
In the comparative dynamic analysis, the interaction is aore complex.
As discussed in Wri&ht and Williams (1982a), responsive supply complements
private storage in stabilizing the market after a shock.

If there is a

shortaae, planned supply expands and raises expected production in the next

-21year.

If there is a alut, the opposite happens.

The implications for

incidence in our standard case are shown in Fiaure 6 for

a

floor price

increased to maintain a constant expected net present value of expenditures.
Yhen supply elasticity ~sis between 0.02 and 0.39, the introduction of
this floor when A0 is 12011i of qN increases net wealth of current producers,

even if they pay the costs of the scheme, by reducina the fall in their land
value more than it reduces the aain on initial stocks.

The extra storage

incurred by the initial defense ~f the floor is exp~cted to be held for such
, a long period before resale that the earlier income-boosting effect

outweiahs the greater. but l!llch later, income-reducing effect of resale.
But supply response, if non-negligible, will greatly reduce the expected
duration of this prior boost in storage, because the present value of the
income-reducing resale becomes more significant.
Figure 6 shows that, contrary to the comparaiive statics analysis,
responsive supply can reverse the incidence of price floors.

The reversal

is more dramatic if producers do not own all the initial stocks, or if
initial availability A0 is lower at the time of the introduction of the
price floor policy.

In both cases initial producers tend to fare worse at

any supply elasticity than shown in Figure 6, and they may even suffer

a

net

loss of wealth under elastic supply. If demand is linear, on the other hand,
the redistribution towards producers shown in Figure 4 is reduced, but not
reversed, by elastic supply.
A plausible extrapolation from the ~tandard deterministic model miaht

lead one to believe that a hiaher supply elasticity would lead to greater
averaae production, and excess burden, at a hiaher price floor.

But Figure

6 shows that, in fact, the present value of the excess burden decreases with
supply elasticity at a given expenditure level before rising again at higher

-22elasticities. The presence of supply response itself makes the effect of a
floor less important, and the prospect of resale of stocks dampens supply
expansion.

As it happens in the case illustrated in Figure 6, mean long-run

supply in the comparative statics sense decreases 0.19' at~ s

c

1.

Under

deficiency payinents, on the other hand, long-run supply response is
positive, in line with conventional intuition.

6.

Stabilization and Risk Aversion
What are the implications of risk aversion for the effects of producer

price supports?
modeled.

The answer depends very much on the way the proble~ is

If producers are risk averse over current farm income, if they

cannot save at all, and if their utility functions are intertemporally
separable, then it is clear that, ceteris paribus, they gain from income
stability.

Although achievement of completely stable consumption and price

would destabilize income from random production, in most realistic cases,
with inelastic consumption demand, price supports will stabilize producer
income.

But what happens to its mean?

Just and Ballam (1978) present a

aodel in which a firm respond positively to the aean and negatively to the
variance of price which is assumed to be exogenous. A reductjon in price
variance causes an outward shift in the supply curve which, they claim,
increases the benefits to producers of stabilization.

In the context of a

co-odity aarlet with inelastic aarlet demand, the result is quite
different.

The outward shift in supply caused by the a1gre1ated responses

of risk-averse firms will aean that greater certainty of output will be
accoapanied by lower expected revenues.

Consequently, it is by no means

obvious that the presence of risk aversion on the part of producers
increases their welfare 1ain from stabilization.
In our aodel the existence of a floor price scheme increases the

-23correlation of income between periods.

As Gelb (1979) has emphasized, much

of the variation is shifted into the lower frequencies.
be very likely that producers would in fact be
reali1ation if it follows one or

■ore

■ ore

Jt appear& to us to

averse to a low income

similarly low realizations.

That is,

the utility function is likely to violate the additivity assUJDption. The
reason that this possibility is excluded from much risk analysis is not that
it is unrealistic, but rather that it violates the axioms of Von
NeUJ11an-N:orgenstern utility theory.

(For more on this see Pollack (1967).)

If utility is not intertemporally separable, the low-frequency fluctuations
induced by a price floor could adversely affect producers.
It seems more reasonable. however. to relax the no-saving assumption,
and model utility as

a

function of wealth rather than of net income.

A

deeper analysis must address the determination of land price in a market of
risk-averse participants. and define the set of assets available for the
producer's portfolio.

These tasks will not be pursued here,

But we

conjecture that two general incidence conclusions continue to be valid:

(l)

the welfare effects on producers are capitalized and borne by current asset
holders at the time of the policy change, and (2) these effects are more
favorable to these landholders than indicated by the previous comparative
statics analyses.

7.

Conclusions
Floor price schemes and deficiency payments have quite different

implications for market participants.

If a floor price is set at a level

below the free-market mean, the scheme will reduce the mean price in the
long run for the usual convex demand curve.
demand (parameter C) is sufficiently high

a

If the curvature of consumption
price floor also reduces

producer income and raises consumer surplus in the steady state.

But the

-24-

incidence effects under this condition depend on the level of the floor and
the source of the market disturbance .

A sufficiently hi&h floor can

substantial ly increase producer wealth (land plus co1DJ11odity stocks) at the
ti111e of introductio n, because the income-boos ting effect of the early
aoc111111lation of public stocks dominates the ne1ative Iona-run effects.
htra-aarte t disposal is aore efficient than a buffer stock as a means of
achievina a aiven transfer to curent holders of land and co1DJDodity stoc16
via a price floor.
.
But if the curva_ture of c-onsump•ticfn demand ·ts sufficiently low, a

floor price scheme using a buffer stock will increase- the weal th of those
holding land and colllJilodity stocks at the time of the (unanticipa ted)
introduction of the scheme by more than the cost of its administrat ion.
This result is true for any effective floor below the mean price, and is
consistent with the long run effect on producer incomes.

At least for

moderate levels of transfer, the floor price scheme supported by

a

buffer

stock is more efficient than enforcement through e:1:tra""111arket disposal of
the commodity, in contrast to cases with greater consumption demand
curvature.

The buffer stock scheme could be profitable as a private venture

organized by an association of producers, even if it could not control
output of the members.
A lower floor, or more elastic supply response, tends to reduce the
positive dynamic effect on wealth and to favor consumers.

A floor price

scheme can also appear much more favorable to consumers. and less expensive,

if private 1tora1e is ianored.

Indeed, the standard analytical approach

which neglects dynamic effects and private storage can so areatly bias
results towards conswners that inferences about incidence effects can easily
be reversed.

-25If the market di~turbancc is an exo&enous shift in forei&n excess
demand, a floor price scheme with a buffer stock favors the source of
instability at the. expense of the domestic economy as a whole.

From the

domestic vie,rpoint, deficiency payments schemes are more efficient means of
increasina wealth of current producers in this situation, provided that the
welfare cost of budaet finance is sufficiently low.

But if supply is

elastic, deficiency payments destabilize consumption by reducin& the
efficiency of the complementary interaction between production and storage.
Like a price floor supported by estra-market disposal, but in contrast to a·
buffer stock scheme, deficiency payments waste resources by inducing a
socially escessive mean Iona-run supply response.
All cases discussed share one. common, elementary feature.

The

incidence on producers occurs only throuah capitalization of benefits as
one-time changes in wealth, and is a purely dynamic phenomenon.

In an

agricultural sector which has a small share of the economy, price supports
have no potential for altering the welfare of current producers in the long
run, so conventional comparative statics studies are inappropriate for
addressing the incidence question.
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2

For the implications of relaxing this assumption see Wright (1984).

3
Tbis is done implicitly in Wright and Williams (1984a). in wliich
Figure V compares a market stabilized by private storage with an
unstabiliz.ed market. In that case steady state producer revenues increase
only if C is less than about 1.5.
offset by costs of the storage.

For l .S

< C < 2,

increased revenues are

In the case of price floors, numerical

results show that the expected steady state change in Sc is negative.

4

If the supply disturbance is additive and refers to domestic

production, responsive supply may mean Jess production and even greater
gains in producer revenue, at the expense of consumers, than indicated in

Propositions 3 and 5.
increases if C

<2

By Proposition 3b, income of producers as a whole

- I. Bere the marginal incentive is the expected price,

which by Proposition 4 falls for C

> 0.

Production contracts, increasing

the producer income gains. More generally, aggregate supply responsiveness
aay favor producers as a group if their supply behavior is heterogeneous.

5

ny assume risk neutrality on the part of private storers?

The

evidence indicates that any risk associated with co111J11odity storage is
eminently diversifiable (see Dusak (1973)), the co111JDents of Carter, Rausser
and Schmitz. (1983), and the response of Marcus (1984)).

Consistent with

-27this !indina, empirical estimates find 'risk premia' in storage markets to
be so small as to be difficult to detect at all.

6

ny competitive stortge7

First, barriers to entry are insianificant.

Second, monopolists would wish to store less than competitors in all 'states
of the world' if they monopolize only storage (Wriaht and Williams 1984b),
so free entry would drive them out.

If

a

monopolist also controls

production, Newbery (1984) has shown that the monopolist may store more than
would a competitive market if demand is linear and price elastic in the
relevant range.

Thus the monopolist could drive out competitive storage.

But here we are concerned with commodity markets in which cons11J11ption demand
is almost invariably price inelastic.

(If it is

tends to be negligible in models like ours.

not, the role of storage

See Wright and Williams

(1982a).)

7

Previous investigations (Wright and Williams 1982a) have shown that

the symmetry of the distribution ,;an be important, but that a distribution
1 ike the one presented here &ives results very similar to those for other
compact symmetric distributions with the same variance, such as an 80 point
discrete appro~imation to the normal distribution.

Evidence on skewness of

yields is sparse, and ambiauous with respect to the direction of skew.
Bence we opt for symmetry as the best aanostic position.

8 •Land' is for simplicity defined here to include all fixed factors
used in production of the commodity.

Land is assllllled to be owned by

producers.

9nis ass1llllption is consistent with a aeneral equilibrium

-28-

overlapping aenerations model with bequests (Calvo, (otlikoff and Rodriquez
(1979)).

But if there are no bequests, the dynamic path of land price to

the new steady state may not involve full Ricardian capitalizat ion. Jn fact,
in an overlapping aeneration context, under reasonable assuiptions , full
capitalizat ion appears to be a limiting case.

These dynamic aeneral

equilibrium issues have been investiaated elsewhere in a non".'"stocha stic
context (Chamley and lri&ht 1983). Bere we confine ourselves to the simpler
Ricardian approach.

10
Recent estimates of the mar&inal welfare cost of public finance
(Stuart 1984 Table 2) tend to lie in the region 0.2 to 0.3. but for
plausible parameteriz ations may wel 1 exceed 0.40. If we took this into
account it is conceivable that the price floor scheme could involve a lower
deadweight loss than an alternative deficiency payments scheme, especially

if the commodity is, from an efficiency viewpoint, 'under-taxe d' in the
current fiscal structure.

11

Indeed. if foreign (stochastic ) excess demand were globally

completely inelastic, then the optimal policy from the rational viewpoint
would be to pay a price of zero to the foreign supplier when buying, and
charae an infinite price when selling, a policy which amounts to a radical
destabiliza tion of border price.

An interesting comparative statics model

of aarket stabilizatio n in an open economy is found in Tyers (1983).
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Table 1

Comparative Statics Effects of Price Support Schemes 8

Consumer
Price

Consumer
~urplp.s

Consumption

Producer Government
Sp.rplus

Expenditure

1.

Ref iciencI Pa?J!ent Scheme
1.1.

1.2.
2.

11S

::::

0

0
(0)

0
(0)

0
(0)

+
(+)

+

+

➔

( +)

(+)

( +)

( +)

"s > o

+
(-)

+
( +)

Floor Price Scheme

A.

2.1.

Multiplicative Production
Disturbance Shared by All
Producers:

11 8 == 0

Sgn(C)
(-)

2.2.

B.
2.3.
2.4

11S

>0

Sgn(C)

0

Sgn(C-1)

(-)

(-)

Sgn(2-C-K)

(-)

(-)

Sgn(C)
(-)

(-)

?

(-)

Sgn (2-C-K)
(-)

Sgn(2-C-K)
(-)

+
(-)

+
( +)

Stochastic Export Demand,
Kean Zero:
11S:: 0
11 8

>0

0

Sgn(C)
(-)

San(C-1)
(-)
?

(-)

(-)

Sgn(C)
(-)

Sgn(C)
(-)

+
( +)

+
( +)

asians of the directions of changes of means, and, in parentheses, standard
4eviations, are shown in the table. C ~ -q(B 2 P/Bq2 )/(8P/Bq) and K is a function of
the chanae in private storage costs, as described in the text.

-30Referenc es

Calvo, Guillerm o A., Kotliko ff, Lawrenc e, and Rodrigu ez, Carlo, A.,
'The Incidenc e of a Tax on Pure Rent:
an Old Answer' .

A New(?) Reason for

Journal of Politica l Economy, 87 No. 4,

(1978): 869-74.
Carter, Colin A., Rausser , Gordon C., and Schmitz , Andrew, 'Efficie nt Assets
Portfoli os and the Theory of Normal Backwa rdation, ' Journal of
Politica l Economy 91 (1983): 319-31.
Chamley , Christop he and Wrigbt, Brian D., 'Tax Incidenc e in a Dynamic Life
Cycle Model With Land,' Cowles Foundat ion Discuss ion Paper, No.
666, April 1983.
Dusak, Katherin e, 'Futures Trading and Investor Returns: An Investig ation of
Commodity Market Risk Premium s,' Journal of Politica l Economy 81
(1973): 1387-14 06.
Gardner , Bruce, 'Efficie nt Redistri bution Through Commodity Markets ,'
American Journal of Agricul tural Economi cs 65 (1983): 225-234 .
___, Optimal Stockpi ling of Grain, Lexingto n, Ma.: Lexingto n Books 1979.
Gelb, Alan, 'On the Definiti on and Measurem ent of Instabi lity and the Costs
of Bufferin g Export Fluctua tions,' Review of Economic Studies 46,
(1979): 149-62.
Belmber aer, Peter, and Weaver, Rob, 'Welfare Implica tion of Commodity

Storaae Under Uncerta inty,' American Journal of Agricul tural
Economi cs 59 (November 1977): 639-51.
7osling , T.E., 'Agricu ltural Policies in Develop ing Countri es: A Review, '
Journal of Agricul tural Economi cs 25 (1974): 220-64.

-31Just, Richard E. and Ballam, J. Arne, 'Functional Flexibility in Commodjty
Price Stabilization Policy,' Proceedings of the Business and
Economics Section of the American Statistical Association (1978):
177-186.
~ydland, Finn E. and Prescott, Edward C.• 'Rules Rather Than Discretion: The

Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,' Journal of Political Economy 85
(1977): 473-491.
Marcus, Alan J .• 'Efficient Asset Portfolios and the Theory of Normal

Backwardatlon: A Comment,' Journal of Political Economy 92
(February 1984): 162-164.
Newbery. D.M.G., 'Commodity Price Stabilization in Imperfect or Cartelized
Markets' Econometrica 52(1984): 563-78.
Newbery, D.M.G. and Stiglitz, J.C., The Theory of Commodity Price
Stabilization, Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1981.

Pollack, R. A•• 'Additive Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Functions,'
Econometrica 35 (July-October 1967): 485-494.
Rothschild, M.• and Sti&litz, J.E •• 'Increasing Risk. I.A. Definition,'
Journal of Economic Theory 2 (1970) 225-43.
Sharples. Jerry A., 'An Examination of U.S. Wheat Policy Since 1977 with
Emphasis on the Farmer-Owned Reserve', USDA, JED Staff Report
November 1980.
Stuart. Charles, 'Welfare Costs per Dollar of Additional Tax Revenue in the

United States,' American Economic Review 74, No. 3, June 1984:
352-362.
Tyer,. Rodney. 'Commodity Stabilization Through Trade and Government Revenue
Under Uncertainty,' Mimeo, Australian National University, 1973.
Williams, Jeffrey C.• The Economic Function of Futures Markets, Cambridge,

U.I.: Cambrid&e University Press (in press).

-32Wright, Brian D., 'The Effects of Ideal Production Stabilizatio n: A Welfa1e
Analysis Under Rational Behavior,' Journal of Political Econoiry
87, No. S, Pt. 1 (October 1979): 1011-1033.
___ , 'The Effects of Price Uncertainty on tie Factor Chofcea of the
Competitive Firm,' Southern Economic Journal

(October 1984).

Wright, Brian D., and Williams, Jeffrey C., 'The Economic Role of Co111JDOdity

Storage,' Economic Journal 92 (September 1982): 596-614 (1982a).

---·

'The Roles of Public and Private Storage in Mana&ing Oil Import
Disruption s,' Bell Journal of Economics 13 (Autumn 1982): 341-53
(1982b).

- - - • 'The Welfare Effects of the Introductio n of Storage,' Quarterly
Journal of Economics 99, No. 1 (February 1984): 169-192 (1984a).

---·

'Anti-Hoard ing Laws: A Stock Condemnatio n Reconsidere d,' American
Journal of Agricultura l Economics, 66 No. 4 (November 1984b):
447-SS.

---·

'Evaluation of Consumer Grains in Uncertain Markets,' Yale University
(1984c).

110%

A

I
\

\

\
\
I

R

fS

Path without
)( __ X - - X Floox

x--"--

R

ss
100%
0

Revenue Expected
as of Time of
Introduction N
- (as a % of R )
R

0

-

)(

I
10

\

0:,

Periods from
Introduction

Path with
Floor

\

I

X

90%
I

X

\

I

X.
80%

FIGURE 1
EFFECT OF A PRICE FLOOR
ON THE EXPECTED TIME PATH OF REVENUE
D

S

N

(n = -0.2, Cs 6, n s 0.0, Floor= 90% of P)

20%
Change in
Net RevNnue
(% of R)

•

2a:

C~nstant Elasticity of De~nd (C = 6),
n s 0.0; Floors 90% of p
Multiplicative Disturbance in Production

10%

•
•
D

0%

D

ti

•
0

0

0

D

D

a

•

•

•

•

•

5

•

•

10

0:,

Periods from
Introduction
of Scheme

20%
Change in
Net Revenu
(% of RN)

2b:

N

Floor of 80% of P

10%

•
•

0%
0

20%
Change in
Net Revenu
(% of RN)

5

10

co

Periods from
Introduction
of Scheme

•
2c:

Linear Demand Curve (C=O)

•

10%

•
0

a

•

C

C

•

0%
0

0

t7

C

•

CJ

tJ

•

•

5

D

C

10
FIGURE 2

EXPECTED EVOLUTION OF REVENUE
AS OF INTRODUCTION OF SCHEME

•

High Initial Availability

0

Low Initial Availability

Periods from
Introduction
of Scheme

co

20%
:!1ar,ge in
Jet Revenue
:% of RN)

2d:

Supply Elasticity of 0.5

10%

•

•
0%

0

10

5

CX)

Periods frorn
Introduction
of Scheme
20%
:hange in
Jet Revenue
'.% of RN)
10%

2e:

Additive Disturbance in Demand

C

c

g

a

•

•

•

•

•

•
•

0%

'\,.

0

0

C]

C

•

•

0

~
•
5

'
•

10

e

•

'v

i

)"

CX)

Periods from
Introduction
of Scheme

20%
2f:
:hange in
fet Revenue
:% of RN)

N

Deficiency Payment, Target 90% of P

•

10%

•

•
0

0%

C

•

•

c:,

C

•

0

•

0

!,

6

e

0

l!
➔

10

5

0

FIGURE 2
EXPECTED EVOLUTION OF REVENUE
AS OF INTRODUCTION OF SCHEME

• High Initial Availability
C]

Low Initial Availability

co

Periods from
Introduction
of Scheme

E

(.;

20%

Change in
Produ ce~ Wealt h
(% of R)

10%

30%

20%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Change in Expec ted Prese nt
Value of Consumer Surpl us

(% of RN)

-20%

(n

D

FIGURE 3
SUR.PLUS TRANSFORMATION CURVES
FOR CONSTANT ELASTICITY DEMAND

-30%

= -0.2, Marked suppo rt level s given
N
as i. of P)

-40%

-50%

Comp arativ e
Stati cs of Floor

60%

FIGURE 4
SURPLUS TRANSFORMATION CURVES
FOR LINEAR DEMAND

50%
Change in
Producer ijealth
(% of R)

D
(n == -0.2, Marked support levels given
N

as a% of P)

40%
H

'

30%

20%

Floor
with

Additive Disturbance

10%

-70%

-60%

-50%

Change in Expected Present
Value of Consumer Surplus
(7, of RN)

-40%

-30%

-20%

-10%

10?

F
K

30

Change in
Producer WNalth
(% of R)

20

10

Disturbance

75
75

0

Budget ~ense
(% of R)

FIGURE 5
BUDGET EFFICIENCY OF THE
WELFARE TRANSFER

100%

95%

Price Floor
~ of % of

p
90%

lelfare Measures
1s a% of Present
7alue of Expendi
:ures on Scheme

I
Dead-1-:eight Loss

I
.4

Supply
Elasticity
.E,

.8

1.0

.2
0% -t-----:--_..,_t-_:-_-_-_:-_:-____..J._t-_-_-_-_:_:_-_-_-_..,.~---_-_-_-_-_:_-_-1-_-_:_:_-_-_-_-_-_:;--

Land Value

-100
FIGURE 6
EFFECT OF RESPONSIVE SUPPLY
HOLDING EXPENDITURES CONSTANT
(n

D= -0.2, C • 6, Ao= 120% of qN)

